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Quantitative	 approaches,	 necessary	 for	 e.g.	 computational-
linguistic	 methods	 such	 as	 argument	 mining,	 require	 large	
annotated	 corpora	 of	 argumentative	 discourse.	 Publicly	
available	corpora	of	argumentation	schemes	often	only	cover	
a	 small	 selection	 of	 example	 schemes	 and	 suffer	 from	 low	
inter-annotator	 agreement.	 To	 address	 this,	 we	 present	 a	
heuristic	 decision	 tree	 for	 the	 classification	 of	Walton's	 top-
level	 taxonomy	 of	 60	 schemes.	 An	 annotation	 study	 on	 505	
arguments	 resulted	 in	 a	 97%	 classification	 covering	 38	
schemes	(Cohen’s	κ	0.723).	
	












quantitative	 approaches,	 while	 labour	 intensive,	 are	 gaining	 traction,	
motivated	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 computational-linguistic	 methods	 such	 as	
argument	mining.	Such	quantitative	approaches	require	large	corpora	of	
argumentative	discourse	annotated	using	theories	of	argumentation.	
Argumentation	 schemes	 capture	 the	 passage	 of	 (typically	
presumptive)	 inference	 from	 a	 set	 of	 premises	 to	 a	 conclusion	
representing	 stereotypical	 patterns	of	 human	 reasoning.	As	 such,	 they	
form	a	historical	descendant	of	the	topics	of	Aristotle	(Aristotle,	1958)	











which	 suffer	 from	 a	 combination	 of	 either	 low	 inter-annotator	
agreement,	 or	 lack	 of	 exhaustive	 coverage,	 with,	 in	 many	 cases,	 only	
those	examples	that	clearly	fit	a	particular	pattern	annotated.	
In	 the	 current	 paper,	 we	 present	 a	 decision	 tree	 for	 the	
classification	 of	 Walton’s	 scheme	 set.	 Whilst	 intended	 primarily	 as	 a	
guide	 for	 annotators,	 the	 decision	 tree	 captures	 a	 detailed	
systematisation	of	 the	 scheme	set,	with	each	of	 the	 top-level	branches	
representing	divisions	into	general	categories	(for	example,	arguments	
based	on	character,	or	on	opinion),	before	breaking	these	down	further	
by	 following	 a	 path	 of	 simple	 questions	 until	 a	 definitive	 scheme	
classification	 is	 reached.	 To	 ensure	 a	 comprehensive	 coverage,	 the	
decision	 tree	 is	 based	 on	 Walton,	 Reed	 and	 Macagno’s	 2008	 book	
Argumentation	Schemes,	which	describes	over	60	schemes.	
In	 order	 to	 test	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 decision	 tree	 to	
challenging,	 real-world	 data,	 an	 annotation	 study	 was	 carried	 out	 to	
classify	 all	 occurrences	 of	 inference	 relations	 in	 an	 existing	
argumentative	 analysis	 of	 the	 first	 US	 presidential	 election	 debate	
between	Hillary	Clinton	and	Donald	Trump.	The	annotation	resulted	in	
substantial	 inter-annotator	 agreement.	 These	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	
application	 of	 the	 decision	 tree	 to	 argumentation	 scheme	 annotation	
constitutes	a	significant	improvement	to	both	reliability	and	breadth	of	
coverage	when	compared	to	previous	scheme	annotation	work.	
The	 rest	of	 the	paper	 is	 structured	as	 follows.	 In	Section	2,	we	
discuss	 relevant	 existing	 annotations	 of	 argumentation	 schemes.	 In	




argumentation	 schemes.	 in	 Section	 4,	 we	 describe	 and	 evaluate	 the	
annotation	 study.	 In	 Sections	5,	we	discuss	ways	of	 further	 improving	
the	 annotation	 of	 argumentation	 schemes,	 by	 considering	 scheme	





The	annotation	of	 argumentation	 schemes	comprises	 the	 classification	
of	 the	 inferential	 relations	 between	 premises	 and	 conclusions	 of	
arguments	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	 particular	 typology.	 While	 we	 start	
from	Walton’s	 typology,	 alternative	 approaches	 are	 also	 employed	 for	
scheme	 identification:	 (Green,	 2015)	 presents	 ten	 custom	
argumentation	 schemes	 for	 genetics	 research	 articles,	 (Musi,	Ghosh,	&	
Muresan,	 2016)	 explore	 annotation	 guidelines	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
Argumentum	 Model	 of	 Topics	 (Rigotti	 &	 Greco,	 2019),	 and	 (Visser,	
Lawrence,	Wagemans,	&	Reed,	2019)	annotate	argumentation	schemes	
on	the	basis	of	the	Periodic	Table	of	Arguments	(Wagemans,	2016).	
Existing	 annotations	 on	 the	 basis	 of	Walton’s	 typology	 tend	 to	
use	 a	 restricted	 set	 of	 scheme	 types,	 and	 struggle	 to	 obtain	 replicable	
results.	For	example,	(Duschl,	2007)	 initially	adopts	a	selection	of	nine	
argumentation	schemes	described	by	(Walton,	1996),	for	his	annotation	
of	 transcribed	 middle-school	 student	 interviews	 about	 science	 fair	
projects.	 Later,	 however,	 he	 collapses	 several	 schemes	 into	 four	more	
general	 classes	 no	 longer	 directly	 related	 to	 particular	 scheme	 types.	
This	deviation	 from	Walton’s	 typology	appears	 to	be	motivated	by	 the	
need	to	improve	annotation	agreement.	The	validation	of	the	annotation	
method	 does	 not	 account	 for	 chance	 agreement,	 by	 only	 providing	
percentage-agreement	 scores	 (instead	 of	 resorting	 to,	 e.g.,	 a	 κ	 or	 α	
metric).	 Out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 17	 texts,	 the	 inter-annotator	 agreement	 is	
reported	on	two	as	90%	and	84%,	without	any	further	detailing	of	the	
sampling	method.	
Similarly,	 (Song,	 Heilman,	 Beigman	 Klebanov,	 &	 Deane,	 2014)	
base	their	annotation	on	a	modification	of	Walton’s	typology,	settling	on	
a	 restricted	 set	 of	 three	 more	 general	 schemes:	 policy,	 causal,	 and	
sample	 –	 resulting	 in	 Cohen’s	 κ	 scores	 for	 inter-annotator	 agreement	
ranging	from	0.364	to	0.848.	(Anthony	&	Kim,	2015)	employ	a	bespoke	
set	of	nine	coding	labels	modified	from	the	categories	used	by	(Duschl,	
2007)	 and	 nine	 schemes	 described	 in	 a	 textbook	 by	 (Walton,	 2006).	
They	do	not	measure	any	inter-annotator	agreement,	opting	for	a	 fully	












To	 facilitate	 the	 process	 of	 annotating	 the	 main	 60	 argumentation	
schemes	 described	 by	Walton,	 Reed	 and	Macagno	 in	 their	 2008	 book	
Argumentation	Schemes,	we	developed	a	classification	decision	tree:	an	
indicative	 heuristic	 for	 the	 annotators,	 to	 intuitively	 support	 their	





decision	 tree	 of	 Figure	1.	 The	decision	 tree	 constitutes	 a	 dichotomous	
identification	tree	that	leads	the	analyst	through	a	series	of	disjunctive	
choices	based	on	the	distinctive	features	of	a	‘species’	of	argumentation	
scheme	 to	 the	 particular	 type.	 Starting	 from	 the	 distinction	 between	
source-based	and	other	arguments,	each	further	choice	in	the	tree	leads	
to	either	a	particular	argumentation	scheme	or	to	a	further	distinction.	
In	 annotating	 Example	 (1),	 an	 analyst	 using	 the	 tree	 follows	 a	
sequence	 of	 numbered	 characteristics	 to	 identify	 the	 argument	 as	 an	
instance	of	practical	reasoning	from	analogy:	Argument	does	not	depend	
on	 a	 source’s	 opinion	 or	 character;	 Conclusion	 is	 about	 a	 course	 of	
action;	 Argument	 hinges	 on	 another	 motivation	 for	 the	 action	 [other	





buy	a	 gun	 in	our	 country.	 If	 you’re	 too	dangerous	 to	 fly,	 you	
are	too	dangerous	to	buy	a	gun.	
	
Figure	 1	 (available	 online	 at:	 http://arg.tech/~john/scheme-tree.png)	
visualises	 the	 decision	 procedure,	 with	 each	 leaf	 representing	 an	
argumentation	scheme	label,	and	all	internal	nodes	showing	clusters	of	
schemes	that	share	particular	characteristic	properties.	For	each	binary	
decision	 point,	 the	 tree	 branches	 into	 two,	 thus	 leading	 the	 annotator	






world	 data,	 an	 annotation	 study	 was	 carried	 out	 to	 classify	 all	
occurrences	of	 inference	relations	 in	US2016G1tv	 (Visser	et	al.,	2019),	





Trump.	 The	 US2016G1tv	 corpus	 (stored	 in	 AIFdb	 (Lawrence	 et	 al.,	
2012),	 and	 available	 online	 at	 corpora.aifdb.org/US2016G1tv)	 is	
annotated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Inference	 Anchoring	 Theory	 (IAT)	 (Reed	 &	
Budzynska,	2011),	 resulting	 in	an	Argument	 Interchange	Format	 (AIF)	
(Chesñevar	et	al.,	2006)	compliant	corpus.	
Two	annotators	used	the	argumentation	scheme	decision	tree	to	
classify	 55%	 of	 the	 505	 inferential	 relations	 within	 the	 corpus;	 for	
example	 classifying	 Example	 (1)	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 the	 argumentation	
scheme	practical	reasoning	from	analogy.	The	two	annotations	resulted	
in	 an	 overlapping	 sample	 of	 10.2%	 of	 the	 corpus	 annotated	 by	 both	
annotators.	 For	 these	 annotations	 a	 Cohen’s	 κ	 (Cohen,	 1960)	 of	 0.723	
was	 achieved;	 well	 within	 the	 category	 of	 ‘substantial	 agreement’	
(Landis	&	Koch,	 1977).	 Some	 classes	of	 argumentation	 scheme	 turned	
out	 to	 be	 particularly	 difficult	 to	 distinguish;	 e.g.,	 Example	 (2)	 was	
classified	by	one	annotator	as	practical	reasoning,	related	to	promoting	














common	 scheme,	 by	 some	 margin,	 is	 argument	 from	 example.	 The	
argument	 from	 expert	 opinion	 scheme,	 an	 often	 used	 example,	 is	






resulted	 in	 substantial	 inter-annotator	 agreement.	 The	 argumentation	
schemes	in	the	decision	tree	are	organised	according	to	their	distinctive	
features	 allowing	 annotators	 to	 distinguish	 between	 them.	 To	 further	
improve	 the	 decision	 tree,	 we	 aim	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 guiding	





The	 classification	 of	 argumentation	 schemes	 should	 not	 be	
regarded	 as	 a	 completed	 structure,	 but	 as	 a	 work	 in	 progress	 that	 is	
continually	 being	 subject	 to	 readjustment	 and	 refinement	 as	 the	
concepts	 defining	 the	 schemes	 are	 formulated	 in	 a	more	 precise	 way	
and	applied	to	new	examples.	We	will	explain	the	research	procedure	of	
improving	a	classification	system	of	schemes	as	a	process	of	continuing	
adjustment	 between	 collecting	 data,	 sharpening	 criteria	 that	 enable	
coders	to	identify	a	scheme,	and	used	to	refine	the	typology	to	assist	the	
continuing	collection	of	data.	
The	 2008	 classification	 system	 (Walton	 et	 al.,	 2008,	 pp.	 349-
350)	divided	schemes	 into	three	general	categories,	reasoning,	source-
based	 arguments	 and	 applying	 rules	 to	 cases.	 Under	 reasoning	 five	
subcategories	 were	 distinguished:	 deductive	 reasoning,	 inductive	
reasoning,	 practical	 reasoning,	 and	 abductive	 reasoning.	 Under	 the	
general	heading	of	 source-based	arguments,	 four	schemes	were	 listed:	
arguments	 from	 position	 to	 know,	 arguments	 from	 commitment,	
arguments	attacking	personal	 credibility,	 and	arguments	 from	popular	
acceptance.	 The	 third	 general	 category	 was	 called	 applying	 rules	 to	
cases.	 It	 had	 four	 subcategories:	 arguments	based	on	 cases,	 defeasible	




researchers	 on	 argumentation.	 For	 example,	 the	 third	 category	 under	






an	 annotation	 heuristic.	 In	 this	 heuristic,	 the	 top	 level	 branches	
represent	 divisions	 and	 the	 general	 categories,	 while	 the	 lower	
branches	 break	 these	 categories	 down	 further	 by	 following	 a	 path	 of	
binary	 questions.	 As	 each	 question	 is	 answered	 the	 user	 is	 directed	
down	 the	 tree	 until	 a	 definitive	 scheme	 classification	 is	 arrived	 at.	
However,	 in	 chapter	 10	 there	 was	 given	 a	 proposed	 classification	
system	 for	 argumentation	 schemes	 (Walton	et	 al.,	 2008,	pp.	349-350).	
One	 might	 wonder	 what	 the	 relationship	 is	 between	 this	 early	
classification	 system	 and	 the	 classification	 decision	 tree	 presently	
offered	as	an	annotation	heuristic.	One	might	also	wonder	whether	the	
2008	classification	system	has	changed	over	the	ten	year	interval	in	the	
continuing	 research	 on	 schemes	 classification	 systems.	 Finally	 one	










system	 of	 schemes	 has	 to	 be	 based	 on	 (such	 concepts	 as	 knowledge,	
causation,	 threat,	 and	 so	 forth),	 any	 attempt	 to	 classify	 schemes	 faces	
conceptual	 difficulties	 in	 adequately	 defining	 the	 contested	 concepts	
used	at	the	top	levels	of	the	tree	structure.	For	this	reason	readers	were	
warned	that	the	2008	system	of	classifying	schemes	was	to	be	regarded	
as	 a	 provisional	 hypothesis	 that	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 improvement	 as	
further	 empirical	 and	 analytical	 work	 on	 schemes	 classification	
continues.	This	warning	is	especially	important	now,	because	in	the	ten	
year	 interval	 the	explosion	of	research	on	argument	mining	has	raised	
many	 fine-grained	 questions	 about	 how	 particular	 groups	 of	 schemes	
should	 be	 fitted	 together	 into	 the	 larger	 picture	 of	 any	 general	
classification	system.	
Some	subsequent	work	(Walton	&	Macagno,	2016)	presented	a	
survey	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 scheme	 classification,	 as	 well	 as	 outlining	
how	 the	 2008	 system	 needs	 to	 be	modified	 in	 order	 to	 accommodate	
current	 research	 in	 artificial	 intelligence	and	 computational	 linguistics	
on	 argument	 mining.	 In	 the	 2016	 paper,	 it	 was	 shown	 how	 the	
procedure	of	developing	and	using	classification	systems	can	only	move	
forward	 by	 combining	 two	 approaches.	 One	 of	 these	 is	 a	 top-down	
approach	 that	 begins	 with	 concepts	 formulated	 at	 a	 high	 level	 of	
abstraction,	 then	moves	 to	 particular	 types	 of	 schemes	 that	 fit	 under	
these	 general	 categories,	 and	 then	 finally	 moves	 to	 schemes	
representing	the	types	of	arguments	we	are	already	so	widely	 familiar	
with.	But	at	the	same	time,	as	research	on	argument	mining	continues,	it	
is	 also	 necessary	 to	 have	 a	 bottom-up	 approach	 (Walton,	 2012)	 that	
begins	with	real	examples	of	arguments	at	the	ground	level	of	cases	that	




To	 get	 a	 general	 idea	 of	 how	 clusters	 of	 schemes	 fit	 into	 an	
encompassing	 schemes	 classification	 system,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 examine	 a	
graph	structure	representing	a	typical	example	showing	how	a	scheme	









Two	 examples	 of	 clusters	 of	 schemes	 are	 indicated	 by	 the	
darkened	borders	of	the	rectangles	and	the	arrows	in	the	components	of	
the	cluster.	The	cluster	displayed	on	the	right	depicts	the	various	kinds	
of	 arguments	 that	 come	 under	 the	 general	 category	 of	 practical	
reasoning.	 Practical	 reasoning	 is	 a	 distinctive	 type	 of	 argument	 in	 its	
own	 right,	 and	 has	 its	 own	 scheme,	 but	 it	 also	 as	 subspecies	 such	 as	
instrumental	 practical	 reasoning	 and	 value-based	 practical	 reasoning.	
The	 cluster	 of	 schemes	 under	 the	 general	 heading	 of	 ad	 hominem	
arguments	 is	displayed	at	 the	 left	of	Figure	2.	This	cluster	 is	shown	as	
incomplete.	Under	the	general	heading	of	ad	hominem	arguments	some	
schemes	 are	 shown	 such	 as	 the	 direct	 ad	 hominem	 argument	 type,	
sometimes	called	the	abusive	ad	hominem	in	the	logic	textbooks,	and	the	
circumstantial	 ad	 hominem	 type.	 However,	 as	 is	 well	 known	 in	 the	
literature,	 there	 are	many	 other	 types	 of	 ad	 hominem	 arguments	 that	
are	not	shown	here	(Walton	et	al.,	2008,	p.	352).	All	that	is	shown	is	an	
elliptical	 node	 at	 the	 bottom	 left	 indicating	 that	 there	 are	 other	 ad	
hominem	 arguments	 that	need	 to	be	classified	within	 this	 cluster.	This	
particular	 graph	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 represent	 Walton’s	 classification	




a	 larger	 graph	 which	 could	 include	 other	 categories	 of	 kinds	 of	
arguments	 that	 are	 not	 defeasible,	 such	 as	 deductive	 modus	 ponens.	
Further	note	that	the	partial	classification	system	is	also	incomplete	at	
the	bottom	level.	For	example,	some	types	of	ad	hominem	arguments	are	
classified	 at	 the	 left	 of	 the	 graph,	 but	 the	 elliptical	 node,	 other	 ad	
hominem	 arguments,	 indicates	 that	 further	 sub	 classifications	 are	
possible.	For	example,	in	(Walton	et	al.,	2008,	p.	352)	a	graph	structure	
is	visually	presented	that	displays	seven	particular	types	of	ad	hominem	
arguments,	 including	 the	 poisoning	 the	 well	 type,	 the	 guilt	 by	
association	type,	the	tu	quoque	type	and	the	circumstantial	ad	hominem	
type,	 subsumed	 under	 the	more	 general	 categories,	 such	 as	 argument	




the	 basic	 slippery	 slope	 type	 of	 argument	 to	 produce	 a	 species	 of	

















Initial	 Premise:	 An	 agent	 α	 is	 considering	 carrying	 out	 an	
action	A0.		




...,	Ay,	 ...,	An	 that	 contains	a	 subsequence	Ax,	 ...,	Ay	 called	 the	
gray	zone	where	x	and	y	are	indeterminate	points.		
Control	Premise:	α	has	 control	over	whether	 to	 stop	carrying	
out	 the	 actions	 in	 the	 sequence	 until	 α	 reaches	 some	
indeterminate	point	in	the	gray	zone	Ax,	...,	Ay.		
Loss	 of	 Control	 Premise:	 Once	 α	 reaches	 the	 indeterminate	
point	in	the	gray	zone	Ax,	.	 .	 .	 ,	Ay,	α	will	lose	control	and	will	
be	 compelled	 to	 keep	 carrying	 out	 actions	 until	 she	 reaches	
An.		






extending	 the	 basic	 scheme,	 and	 one	 of	 these,	 the	 precedent	 type	 of	
slippery	slope	argument,	which	generates	a	sequence	whereby	one	case	
is	a	precedent	for	a	second	one,	and	the	second	one	is	a	precedent	for	a	
third	 one,	 and	 so	 forth.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 2,	 the	 precedent	 slippery	







Being	 aware	 of	 how	 this	 cluster	 of	 arguments	 is	 formed	 is	 helpful	 for	
enabling	annotators	 to	distinguish	between	a	precedent	slippery	slope	









on	 argumentation	 schemes	 is	 that	 the	 annotators	 lack	 enough	 specific	
guidance	on	how	to	decide	whether	an	argument	found	in	a	real	natural	
language	text	can	properly	be	said	to	fit	a	particular	scheme	or	not.	An	
early	 study	 which	 used	 schemes	 to	 classify	 kinds	 of	 arguments	 put	
forward	 by	 candidates	 in	 a	 provincial	 election	 in	 Canada	 (Hansen	 &	
Walton,	 2013)	 classified	 256	 arguments	 using	 14	 schemes	 and	 a	
category	 called	 “none	of	 the	 above”.	A	 group	of	 six	 annotators,	 two	of	
them	 experts	 in	 argumentation	 theory,	 collected	 arguments	 found	 in	
newspaper	 articles	 reporting	 arguments	 commenting	 on	 issues	 being	
debated	 in	 the	campaign.	The	difficulty	 they	encountered	was	 that	 the	
four	 non-expert	 annotators,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 two	 experts	 in	 some	
instances,	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 classify	 arguments	 in	 some	 instances	
because	 of	 the	 open	 texture	 of	 key	 terms	 used	 in	 the	 schemes.	 For	
example,	 annotators	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 differentiate	 between	 a	
circumstantial	 ad	 hominem	 argument	 and	 an	 argument	 from	
inconsistency,	 a	 species	 of	 argument	 from	 commitment.	 Both	 kinds	 of	
arguments	allege	that	an	opposed	arguer	has	put	forward	an	argument,	





The	 solution	 to	 this	 problem	 recommended	 in	 (Walton,	 2012)	
was	to	devise	a	set	of	so-called	identification	conditions	that	can	be	used	
to	offer	annotators	additional	guidance	on	whether	a	particular	scheme	
fits	 a	 particular	 case	 or	 not.	 There	 were	 24	 of	 these	 identification	
conditions	formulated	by	Walton	(2012,	pp.	49-56).	A	current	project	is	
to	refine	these	conditions	to	make	them	more	precise	and	easier	to	use.	
To	 give	 the	 reader	 an	 idea	 of	what	 these	 kinds	 of	 conditions	 are	 like,	
here	are	six	of	the	reformulated	ones.	
	




the	way	 a	 has	put	A	 forward	 as	 a	 claim	 (assertion)	 in	 a	







(IC2)	 Direct	Ad	 Hominem	 Argument:	 there	 has	 to	 be	 (1)	 not	
only	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 arguer’s	 ethical	 character	 (ethos),	
but	(2)	this	attack	has	to	be	used	to	discredit	the	arguer’s	
credibility	 (personal	 trustworthiness	as	a	source),	 (3)	 in	
order	to	try	to	defeat	his	argument.	
(IC3)	 Circumstantial	Ad	Hominem	 Argument:	 there	 has	 to	 be	
(1)	an	attack	on	the	arguer’s	ethical	character,	but	(2)	this	
attack	has	to	be	based	on	an	alleged	inconsistency	among	
the	 arguer’s	 commitments	 (3)	 which	 has	 to	 be	 used	 to	
discredit	 the	 arguer’s	 credibility	 (personal	
trustworthiness	 as	 a	 source),	 and	 (4)	 the	 premises	 (1),	
(2)	 and	 (3)	 have	 to	 be	 put	 forward	 to	 try	 to	 defeat	 his	
argument.	
(IC4)	 Argument	 from	Values:	 (1)	 The	 audience	 to	whom	 the	
argument	is	addressed	is	thought	by	the	arguer	to	hold	a	
positive	(or	negative)	value	with	respect	to	a	proposition,	
and	 (2)	 appeal	 to	 this	 value	 is	 used	 by	 the	 arguer	 as	 a	





is	 made	 that	 A,	 if	 carried	 out,	 with	 have	 positive	
consequences,	 (4)	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘positive’	means	 that	
the	 action	 is	 claimed	 to	 have	 positive	 value	 for	 the	
audience	 the	 argument	 is	 directed	 to,	 and	 (5)	 on	 this	




con	 A	 arguments	 are	 being	 considered,	 (3)	 the	 claim	 is	
made	 that	 A,	 if	 carried	 out,	 with	 have	 negative	
consequences,	 (4)	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘negative’	means	 that	
the	 action	 is	 claimed	 to	 have	 negative	 value	 for	 the	
audience	 the	 argument	 is	 directed	 to,	 and	 (5)	 on	 this	
basis	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 the	 audience	 should	 decline	 to	
support	the	proposal	to	carry	out	A.	
	
The	 other	 identification	 conditions	 have	 the	 same	 general	 format,	
except	 that	 some	 of	 them	 are	 more	 complex	 forms	 of	 argument	 that	
contain	simpler	forms	of	argument,	such	as	the	seven	types	represented	
above.	One	scheme	can	be	shown	to	contain	another	scheme,	using	the	
identification	 conditions,	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 this	 relationship	 can	 be	
visually	 displayed	 as	 a	 graph.	 By	 this	 means,	 for	 example,	 a	 complex	
scheme,	such	as	 the	slippery	slope	argument,	can	be	shown	to	contain	









three	 types	 of	 arguments	 pervaded	 Hansen	 and	 Walton’s	 (2013)	
election	 project	 because	 we	 found	 numerous	 examples	 of	 argument	
from	 inconsistent	 commitments,	 some	 of	 them	 arguably	 being	 ad	
hominem	 arguments,	 some	 arguably	 not.	 A	 first	 step	 toward	 resolving	
the	problem	is	to	treat	the	circumstantial	ad	hominem	argument	(CA)	as	
being	a	subspecies	of	the	wider	category	of	argument	from	inconsistent	
commitments	 (IC),	 which	 is	 in	 turn	 a	 subspecies	 of	 argument	 from	
commitment	 (AC)	 and	 the	 direct	 ad	 hominem	 argument	 (DA)	 –	 see	
Figure	4.	








argument	 from	values	(AV)	are	carried	over	and	 incorporated	 into	the	
structure	 for	argument	 from	value-based	practical	 reasoning	(VBPR)	–	



















Once	 this	 method	 is	 used	 to	 form	 several	 clusters	 of	 schemes,	 the	
clusters	can	be	all	put	together	 into	a	 larger	classification	graph	of	 the	
kind	illustrated	in	Figure	2.	But	it	is	not	certain	what	will	happen	when	
this	 is	done	on	a	very	 large	scale.	 It	may	be	that	there	are	connections	




and	classified,	 the	clusters	can	be	expected	 to	grow	 in	complexity.	For	




This	 procedure	 is	 circular	 in	 nature,	 but	 in	 this	 instance	 the	
circularity	 is	not	 evidence	 that	 a	 fallacy	has	been	committed.	 It	 shows	
that	 the	 activity	 of	 collecting	 data	 from	natural	 language	 corpora,	 and	
using	that	to	refine	the	classification	system,	is	a	defeasible	but	scientific	
way	of	collecting	evidence	for	or	against	a	hypothesis	and	improving	it	
by	 feedback.	 The	 recursive	 application	 of	 the	 procedure	 improves	 the	
accuracy	of	the	formulation	of	the	schemes.	








terms.	 By	 this	means,	 both	 tools,	 the	 identification	 conditions	 and	 the	










Theory-driven	 applications	 of	 computational	models	 of	 argument,	 and	
empirically	 oriented	 work	 alike,	 rely	 on	 data	 about	 the	 actual	 use	 of	
argumentation	 in	 practice.	 The	 availability	 of	 large,	 reliable,	 and	
representative	 datasets	 of	 argumentation	 scheme	 usage	 is	 essential	
both	to	the	empirical	study	of	such	schemes,	and	to	the	development	of	
automated	 classifiers	 and	 argument	 mining	 techniques	 (Budzynska	 &	
Villata,	 2017).	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 present	 a	 decision	 tree	 heuristic	 for	
annotating	 argumentation	 schemes.	 The	 decision	 tree	 supports	
annotation	 which	 is	 both	 comprehensive	 in	 the	 range	 of	 schemes	 it	
covers,	and	reliable	in	the	results	obtained.	Finally,	we	have	considered	
future	directions	for	improving	the	decision	tree,	taking	into	account	the	
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